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I. INTRODUCTION 
As a sitting trial-court judge in Tacoma, Washington, since 2004, I 
have seen numerous applications of Crawford v. Washington,1 a case that 
has changed the application of the Confrontation Clause2 to “testimonial 
hearsay.” Federal and state courts use Crawford3 to apply the Confronta-
tion Clause to testimonial hearsay in a variety of contexts, from 911 calls 
offered under the excited utterance hearsay exception4 to statements of 
laboratory analysts.5 Increasingly, Crawford issues arise when prosecu-
tors seek to present gang expert testimony, ostensibly under the provi-
sions of Federal Rule of Evidence (FRE) and Washington Rule of Evi-
dence 703 (collectively ER 703).6 This trend raises an important ques-
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 1. Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004). 
 2. U.S. CONST. amend. VI. 
 3. Although the Court in Crawford generally defined testimonial hearsay, it did not provide a 
precise definition. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 53–56. Instead, it provided examples. Id. Doing so was 
perhaps a recognition of the potential for the wide variety of applications of this concept. This point 
will be addressed in greater detail infra at Part II. 
 4. WASH. R. EVID. 803. 
 5. Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 129 S. Ct. 2527, 2551–52 (2009); State v. Lui, 153 Wash. 
App. 304, 317–20, 221 P.3d 948 (2009). 
 6. FED. R. EVID. 703; WASH. R. EVID. 703. 
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tion: Should the principles of Crawford extend to gang expert testimo-
ny?7 
Crime in America has become more sophisticated in the twenty-
first century. Law enforcement, in an effort to keep pace, has developed 
a number of subspecialties in investigation. These expert subspecialties 
include accident reconstruction, methamphetamine production, and even 
drug recognition.8 As a trial-court judge, I have seen a number of these 
law enforcement experts testify. While often qualifying as experts under 
ER 703, they also retain the status of fact witness, typically as the lead 
investigator. Their dual status creates a natural tension: Are the witnesses 
rendering fact testimony or are they testifying as experts? Among the 
blurred areas of factual versus expert testimony is that of gang expert 
testimony. Here, the police officer often occupies two roles, one as inves-
tigator and one as expert. Although the use of gang expert testimony is 
relatively unique to Washington State,9 such testimony presents the same 
“fact witness/expert witness” tension as testimony given by other types 
of law enforcement experts. Often, testimony from a law enforcement 
expert contributes to a defendant’s ultimate conviction. I offer the fol-
lowing hypothetical to illuminate the Crawford issues presented by gang 
expert testimony.10 Both federal and state courts throughout the United 
States commonly encounter these issues, following the pattern depicted. 
For the purposes of this hypothetical, the case name is State of 
Washington v. Alexander Morano. The charge was sale and trafficking of 
controlled substances under Washington’s Racketeering Influenced and 
Corrupt Organizations Act.11 The complaint alleged that as a member of 
a criminal enterprise, the GD 18 gang, Morano led a criminal organiza-
tion that distributed drugs, committed car thefts, and bribed public offi-
cials. The complaint further alleged that Morano engaged in a large-scale 
                                                 
 7. See generally Julie A. Seaman, Triangulating Testimonial Hearsay: The Constitutional 
Boundaries of Expert Opinion Testimony, 96 GEO. L.J. 827 (2008); Patrick Mark Mahoney, Note, 
Houses Built on Sand: Police Expert Testimony in California Gang Prosecutions; Did Gardeley Go 
Too Far?, 31 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 385 (2004). Specifically, expert testimony that includes what 
would otherwise be considered testimonial hearsay raises Crawford implications. Should the fact 
that testimony is expert testimony remove it from the purview of Crawford? 
 8. State v. Baity, 140 Wash. 2d 1, 3–6, 991 P.2d 1151 (2000). 
 9. To date, only one case has been decided on gang expert testimony and its connection to 
Crawford. State v. McDaniel, 155 Wash. App. 829, 230 P.3d 245 (2010). 
 10. This is a hypothetical scenario based on United States v. Mejia, 545 F.3d 179 (2d. Cir. 
2008). Nothing in this fictional account is intended to represent any particular known gang organiza-
tion or ongoing criminal investigation. This fictional account is not intended in any way to disparage 
any particular ethnic group. The reality of gang sociology in America is that gang membership is 
often based on common ethnicity among members. 
 11. WASH. REV. CODE § 9A.82.010 (2008). 
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operation selling controlled substances with a number of other GD 18 
gang members. 
In its case-in-chief, the prosecution sought to present Alexander Or-
tiz as a gang expert to testify about the organizational structure, methods, 
history, and vocabulary of GD 18, a gang well-known in King County 
and throughout the State of Washington. In his curriculum vitae, Ortiz 
revealed that he was an eighteen-year veteran of the Seattle Police De-
partment and had been a narcotics investigator since 2000. Five years 
before the trial, Ortiz was assigned to the Greater Puget Sound Gang 
Narcotics Network (GANGNET). He was also the chairman of the 
Gang/Narcotics Committee of the Washington–Oregon Information 
Network, an organization comprised of narcotics investigators through-
out Washington and Oregon.12 
In its motions in limine, the defense objected to Ortiz’s proposed 
testimony, arguing that he would rely on inadmissible testimonial hear-
say in reaching his conclusions. The accompanying memorandum of au-
thorities relied in part on the authority of Crawford,13 Davis v. Washing-
ton,14 and State v. Mason.15 
During oral argument preceding trial, defense counsel was allowed 
to voir dire Ortiz. In response to defense counsel’s questioning, Ortiz 
said he had participated in over 200 GD 18 investigations. As an investi-
gator, he said, he had conducted approximately 100 custodial interroga-
tions of “dozens” of GD 18 members. When asked whether he could dis-
tinguish between information learned during custodial interrogations and 
elsewhere, Ortiz replied that his testimony was “an amalgam of informa-
tion acquired from numerous sources.” Additionally, he stated that he 
had attended a dozen separate gang “seminars” sponsored by state and 
federal law enforcement agencies. During these seminars, gang experts, 
all of whom were state or federal law enforcement officials, lectured on 
the dynamics of gang organization. 
Ortiz admitted that he had little formal education, other than the po-
lice academy and numerous gang seminars. His formal education was 
limited to one year of community college, during which he took only one 
class that addressed criminal conduct: sociology. The class did not ad-
dress gang issues. 
                                                 
 12. To my knowledge, there is no such law enforcement organization in existence. Any simi-
larity to an existing police organization anywhere in the State of Washington is purely coincidental. 
Police organizations in different jurisdictions often create collaborative organizations known as 
“networks,” frequently characterized by an acronym containing the letters “NET.” 
 13. 541 U.S. 36 (2004). 
 14. 547 U.S. 813 (2006). 
 15. 127 Wash. App. 554, 126 P.3d 34 (2005); 160 Wash. 2d 910, 162 P.3d 396 (2007). 
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In response to an inquiry from the court, the government stated that 
Ortiz would offer, if allowed, an expert opinion that the defendant was a 
member of GD 18, that his business operations and procedures were con-
sistent with those of GD 18, and that the lexicon of words used in writ-
ings seized from his residence during the execution of a search warrant 
were consistent with those of GD 18. At the conclusion of the hearing, 
the defense argued that Ortiz was not qualified as an expert. Alternative-
ly, the defense argued that Ortiz’s testimony was based in large part on 
inadmissible hearsay, much of it qualifying as testimonial hearsay barred 
by Crawford.16 Supplementing this argument, the defense pointed out 
that, on a practical level, there was nothing to prevent the witness from 
giving the jury a laundry list of facts and telling the jury what to con-
clude from them. Specifically, the defense worried the jury would deter-
mine that the defendant was a gang member. Because the crimes charged 
fell within Washington’s RICO statute, a finding by the jury that the de-
fendant committed the charged crimes as part of a criminal enterprise 
would subject him to a longer sentence.17 Should the court deny its mo-
                                                 
 16. 541 U.S. 36, 68–69 (2004). 
 17. The following statutes allow for a sentencing judge to depart from sentencing guidelines 
and sentence an offender up to the jurisdictional maximum for a given offense: WASH. REV. CODE 
§ 9.94A.535(3)(s) (2008) (“The defendant committed the offense to obtain or maintain his or her 
membership or to advance his or her position in the hierarchy of an organization, association, or 
identifiable group.”); id. § (3)(z)(ii)(aa) (“The defendant committed the offense with the intent to 
directly or indirectly cause any benefit, aggrandizement, gain, profit, or other advantage to or for a 
criminal street gang as defined in [WASH. REV. CODE § 9.94A.030 (2008)], its reputation, influence, 
or membership.”); WASH. REV. CODE § 9.94A.030(12) (2008) (“‘Criminal street gang’ means any 
ongoing organization, association, or group of three or more persons, whether formal or informal, 
having a common name or common identifying sign or symbol, having as one of its primary activi-
ties the commission of criminal acts, and whose members or associates individually or collectively 
engage in or have engaged in a pattern of criminal street gang activity. This definition does not apply 
to employees engaged in concerted activities for their mutual aid and protection, or to the activities 
of labor and bona fide nonprofit organizations or their members or agents.”); id. § (13) (“‘Criminal 
street gang associate or member’ means any person who actively participates in any criminal street 
gang and who intentionally promotes, furthers, or assists in any criminal act by the criminal street 
gang.”); id. § (14) (“‘Criminal street gang-related offense’ means any felony or misdemeanor of-
fense, whether in this state or elsewhere, that is committed for the benefit of, at the direction of, or in 
association with any criminal street gang, or is committed with the intent to promote, further, or 
assist in any criminal conduct by the gang, or is committed for one or more of the following rea-
sons: (a) To gain admission, prestige, or promotion within the gang; (b) To increase or maintain the 
gang’s size, membership, prestige, dominance, or control in any geographical area; (c) To exact 
revenge or retribution for the gang or any member of the gang; (d) To obstruct justice, or intimidate 
or eliminate any witness against the gang or any member of the gang; (e) To directly or indirectly 
cause any benefit, aggrandizement, gain, profit, or other advantage for the gang, its reputation, influ-
ence or membership; or (f) To provide the gang with any advantage in, or any control or dominance 
over any criminal market sector including, but not limited to, manufacturing, delivering, or selling 
any controlled substance [WASH. REV. CODE § 69.50]; arson [WASH. REV. CODE § 9A.48]; traffick-
ing in stolen property [WASH. REV. CODE § 9A.82]; promoting prostitution [WASH. REV. CODE 
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tion, the defense asked that the court limit Ortiz’s testimony to those 
matters that were not hearsay, did not violate the Confrontation Clause, 
and stayed strictly within the confines of his expertise. The defense ex-
plicitly asked the court to exclude from evidence Ortiz’s personal opi-
nion as the investigating police officer. 
The court denied the motion, ruling that, under the provisions of ER 
703, otherwise inadmissible evidence, including hearsay—even testi-
monial hearsay—could form the basis for an expert opinion. 
At trial, most of Ortiz’s testimony concerned the background of GD 
18. He testified about its history, presence in the state, and connections 
with sister criminal organizations around the United States and abroad. 
He identified the gang’s colors, hand signs, graffiti, and tattoos showing 
affiliation. He explained in detail the sociology of the gang, including 
formal and informal communication systems, the most common modes 
of communication, the organizational chain of command, and the rules of 
leadership. His testimony included descriptions of a gender hierarchy in 
which women were not allowed affiliation, but were instead relegated to 
an auxiliary role, not unlike a “support group” for the male gang mem-
bers. 
With regard to the gang’s operation in Washington, Ortiz testified 
that since he began gang investigations some seven years earlier, he had 
seized approximately forty weapons from GD 18 gang members. Finally, 
he described in great detail how the gang put a “drug tax” on sales of 
narcotics at certain bars. Throughout the testimony, he explained how his 
knowledge, training, and experience led him to conclude that the defen-
dant was not only a member of GD 18, but also a leader. 
On cross-examination, the defense focused on the sources of Ortiz’s 
information about the defendant.18 
Q: You testified that the gang supported itself in its early years by 
the sale of marijuana imported from Mexico? 
A: Yes. 
Q: Is it fair to say that someone told you that? 
A: Yes. I learned that from numerous custodial interrogations of 
known and reputed gang members. I have also learned that from 
other law enforcement members who have conducted numerous GD 
18 custodial interrogations. 
                                                                                                             
§ 9A.88]; human trafficking [WASH. REV. CODE § 9A.40.100]; or promoting pornography [WASH. 
REV. CODE § 9.68].”). 
 18. The following section depicting a direct and cross-examination of a gang expert is based on 
excerpts of the gang expert testimony reported in United States v. Mejia, 545 F.3d 187–89 (2d. Cir. 
2008). 
862 Seattle University Law Review [Vol. 34:857 
Q: You also told the jury that gang members placed a tax on narcot-
ics sold in certain bars, isn’t that correct? And that your undercover 
investigation placed the defendant in those same bars on a regular 
basis? 
A: Yes, I learned that in casual conversation with a gang member. 
Q: Actually, it was more than causal, wasn’t it? In fact, it wasn’t a 
casual conversation at all. It was a custodial interrogation of a gang 
member, and it took place at the county prosecutor’s office? 
A: Yes. The gang member I interviewed had been charged but was 
pending arraignment, and therefore, bail had not yet been set. Mem-
bers of our regional drug task force escorted him to the prosecutor’s 
office for our conversation. 
Q: Why was this person arrested? 
A: It was part of the same investigation concerning your client, Mr. 
Morano. 
Q: Is it fair to say that most of what you learned about GD 18, at 
least as it relates to Mr. Morano, and have expressed here, is a result 
of your interrogation of multiple suspects in custody? 
A: Yes. 
Q: How many suspects? 
A: Nine. 
Q: Of these nine suspects, how many are currently present and 
available for this trial? 
A: Three are still in custody awaiting trial. Six made bail, and of 
those, two were deported due to a clerical error, two are dead, assas-
sinated by a rival gang, and two are just gone. There are warrants 
outstanding for the last two and also for the two that were deported, 
although they are probably still out of the country. 
Q: And none of those witnesses were subject to a prior cross-
examination by the defendant in this case, correct? 
A: Correct. 
Following the cross-examination of Ortiz, the defense again asked 
that his testimony be stricken and that a mistrial be granted. The defense 
rationale rested on two arguments: first, the officer’s testimony relied 
almost exclusively on testimonial hearsay and therefore violated the 
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Crawford requirements; and second, the officer’s alleged expertise in 
gang matters did not meet the requirements of Frye v. United States.19 
In denying the defense motions, the court first emphasized that it 
was satisfied that gang expertise was recognized under the applicable 
“scientific community” defined in Frye,20 and that the requirements of 
ER 702 were satisfied. As to the Crawford argument, the court empha-
sized two points in its holding. First, Crawford did not apply because the 
information on which the expert based his opinion was not being offered 
to prove the truth of the matter asserted. Second, so long as an expert 
relies on hearsay that is regularly relied on by experts in the field, testi-
monial or otherwise, such reliance does not preclude its admission or 
violate Crawford. Because the evidence presented was beyond the skill 
and expertise of a lay person and would assist a jury in understanding the 
evidence, it met the requirements of ER 703.21 Accordingly, the court 
admitted the evidence and the defendant was convicted of all counts, in-
cluding a special finding that he was involved in an organized criminal 
enterprise, which enhanced his mandatory sentence under Washington 
law.22 
This Article will explore the issues raised by this fact pattern. Spe-
cifically, this Article will discuss how gang expert reliance on testimoni-
al hearsay violates Crawford.23 Both the spirit and letter of Crawford are 
violated when the information relied on by law enforcement has not 
passed the “crucible”24 of pretrial cross-examination mandated by Craw-
ford to assure reliability. Moreover, this Article will offer a way to re-
concile ER 703 with the requirements of Crawford. 
Part II of this Article will discuss the history and application of 
Crawford and its expansion into virtually every area of testimonial hear-
say. Part III will discuss the evolving and growing area of gang expert 
                                                 
 19. Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923). 
 20. Id. 
 21. Nothing in ER 703 requires that the facts or data relied on by an expert be admissible as 
evidence. City of Bellevue v. Kravik, 69 Wash. App. 735, 850 P.2d 559 (1993); 5D KARL B. 
TEGLAND, COURTROOM HANDBOOK ON WASHINGTON EVIDENCE 378 (5th ed. 2010). 
 22. WASH. REV. CODE § 9.94A.535 (2010); WASH. REV. CODE § 9.94A.030 (2011). In 2010, 
the Washington Legislature enacted these two statutes that (1) define a gang activity and (2) allow 
for a sentencing enhancement. WASH. REV. CODE § 9.94A.535(aa) (2010) (“The defendant commit-
ted the offense with the intent to directly or indirectly cause any benefit, aggrandizement, gain, prof-
it, or other advantage to or for a criminal street gang as defined in RCW 9.94A.030, its reputation, 
influence, or membership.”). This provision makes gang affiliation part of the aggravating circums-
tances allowed in imposition of an exceptional sentence outside the standard ranges reflected in 
Wash. Rev. Code § 9.94A et. seq. In this case, the court could, in theory, sentence the defendant up 
to the statutory maximum sentence of ten years in prison and a ten-thousand-dollar fine. This is the 
statutory maximum for sale and delivery of controlled substances. 
 23. Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004). 
 24. Id. 
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testimony as a “science.” Part IV will expose the intersection of gang 
expert testimony and the Confrontation Clause, showing how gang ex-
pert testimony can often be based on testimonial hearsay and therefore 
violate both the spirit and letter of Crawford.25 This Part will show how 
the growing area of gang expertise and the principles of Crawford are on 
a collision course. The end product of this course is the admission of tes-
timonial hearsay by way of expert testimony, all with a view toward 
conviction rather than ensuring a defendant’s right to effectively cross-
examine the witnesses providing evidence against him. As a result, hun-
dreds, if not thousands, of alleged gang members nationwide have been, 
and will be, convicted without the benefit of cross-examination and, 
therefore, a fair trial.26 Finally, Part V will devise a test for excluding that 
portion of gang expert testimony that relies on testimonial hearsay de-
rived without the benefit of cross-examination in violation of Crawford. 
II. CRAWFORD V. WASHINGTON AND THE RIGHT TO CONFRONTATION 
The Crawford decision was a dramatic departure from traditional 
Confrontation Clause precedent. Previously, in Ohio v. Roberts,27 the 
Supreme Court held that the introduction of an unavailable witness’s 
hearsay statement did not violate the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth 
Amendment so long as the trial judge found that the hearsay was reliable 
and trustworthy.28 In arriving at its conclusion, the Roberts Court advo-
cated using the same criteria for Confrontation Clause analysis as for 
hearsay analysis. The decision charged judges with determining the re-
liability of testimonial hearsay29 exclusively from “firmly rooted hearsay 
exceptions.”30 If a statement met the criteria of a recognized exception to 
the hearsay rule, then it met Confrontation Clause requirements as well. 
In Crawford, however, the Court shifted course, changing the criteria for 
admissibility from an assessment of reliability and trustworthiness of 
testimonial hearsay to an absolute exclusion of testimonial hearsay from 
unavailable declarants absent a prior right of cross-examination.31 
A full appreciation of Crawford’s implications requires an under-
standing of the Crawford holding and its interpretations. This Part will 
provide background on the facts and holding of Crawford, along with a 
discussion of subsequent case law. 
                                                 
 25. Id. 
 26. See generally Seaman, supra note 7; Mahoney, supra note 7. 
 27. Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56 (1980). 
 28. Id. at 72–73. 
 29. Id. at 62–63. 
 30. Id. at 66. 
 31. Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 59 (2004). 
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The case concerned a defendant, Crawford, who was ultimately 
convicted of assault.32 Briefly, the facts were the following: Crawford’s 
wife told him that a mutual friend had sexually assaulted her some weeks 
earlier.33 Soon thereafter, Crawford and his wife went to confront the 
friend.34 That confrontation culminated in Crawford stabbing the friend.35 
In his statement to police, Crawford insisted that the friend had assaulted 
his wife only a few hours earlier and had attacked him with a knife, the-
reby necessitating self-defense.36 But, in a separate statement, Craw-
ford’s wife said that the assault had occurred some weeks earlier, and 
that although the friend did present a knife, he did so only after Crawford 
had stabbed him once.37 Because her statement was at odds with Craw-
ford’s self-defense position, Crawford asserted the marital privilege to 
preclude his wife from testifying.38 The State moved to admit his wife’s 
two statements as statements against penal interest and, therefore, excep-
tions to the hearsay rule.39 The lower court agreed, holding that because 
the statements were reliable and trustworthy, they not only satisfied the 
hearsay rule, but also the Confrontation Clause.40 Although the court of 
appeals reversed, it did so exclusively on the question of whether the 
statements of the wife constituted admissible hearsay.41 The Washington 
Supreme Court held that while her statements were not “firmly rooted” 
exceptions to the hearsay rule, they were reliable.42 
In rejecting the holding of the Washington Supreme Court, the U.S. 
Supreme Court first reviewed the history of the Confrontation Clause, 
focusing on the trial of Sir Walter Raleigh.43 It also criticized the civil 
law system as the proper mode of criminal prosecution, in that it did not 
include cross-examination.44 Instead, the Court referred to cross-
                                                 
 32. Id. at 40. 
 33. Id. at 38. 
 34. Id. at 38–39. 
 35. Id. 
 36. Id. at 38–40. 
 37. Id. 
 38. Id. at 40. 
 39. Id. 
 40. Id. 
 41. Id. at 41. 
 42. Id. 
 43. Id. at 43. 
 44. Id. at 43–47. Most countries in the world are civil law countries. These countries have 
systems based on codes, such as the Napoleonic Codes, Roman Codes, or in the Middle East, the 
Hammurabic Code. None of these systems have jury trials. In fact, many are now attempting to 
integrate jury-trial rights into their codes. Instead of being based on an adversarial truth-seeking 
model, courts in most countries are inquisitorial. When Crawford speaks of the “civil law” system, it 
is referring to these courts. 
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examination as the “litmus test” for reliability of testimonial hearsay.45 
The Court concluded that the Roberts reliability test, which required the 
judge to assess reliability, was at best unpredictable.46 Specifically, the 
majority held that if a defendant does not have an opportunity to cross-
examine a declarant, the defendant’s right to confrontation is violated 
when an out-of-court testimonial statement is admitted into evidence. 
This is true even if that statement otherwise falls within a firmly rooted 
hearsay exception under state law.47 Justice Scalia, writing for the major-
ity, stated that the drafters of the Sixth Amendment did not envision that 
the fundamental requirement of cross-examination of a declarant could 
be dispensed with merely by a showing that a statement was reliable and 
trustworthy.48 Although the Court neither precisely nor expansively de-
fined “testimonial,”49 it did give specific examples and identified three 
categories of testimonial-type statements.50 First, testimonial hearsay 
includes statements characterized as in-court testimony or its functional 
equivalent.51 Second, it includes statements referred to as extra-judicial. 
Third, it includes statements made under circumstances leading an objec-
tive witness to reasonably believe that the statement would be available 
for use later at trial.52 Specific examples provided by the Court included 
prior testimony at trial or grand jury, affidavits, custodial examinations, 
depositions, and any other prior statement that might likely be used at 
trial.53 The Court further suggested that any hearsay that could be used in 
a prosecution of the accused could fit within the definition of “testimoni-
                                                 
 45. Id. at 50. 
 46. Id. at 60 (citing Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 66 (1980)). 
 47. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 60–64. 
 48. Id. at 50. 
 49. Id. at 68. The Court stated: 
Where nontestimonial hearsay is at issue, it is wholly consistent with the Framers’ design 
to afford the States flexibility in their development of hearsay law—as does Roberts, and 
as would an approach that exempted such statements from Confrontation Clause scrutiny 
altogether. Where testimonial evidence is at issue, however, the Sixth Amendment de-
mands what the common law required: unavailability and prior opportunity for cross-
examination. We leave for another day any effort to spell out a comprehensive definition 
of “testimonial.” Whatever else the term covers, it applies at a minimum to prior testi-
mony at a preliminary hearing, before a grand jury, or at a former trial; and to police in-
terrogations. These are the modern practices with closest kinship to the abuses at which 
the Confrontation Clause was directed. 
Id. (emphasis added); see also Daniel M. Froehlich, The Impact of Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts 
on Admissibility of Forensic Test Results at Court-Martial, ARMY LAW., Feb. 2010, available at 
http://www.loc.gov/rr/frd/Military_Law/pdf/02-2010.pdf. 
 50. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 51–52. 
 51. Id. 
 52. Id.; Froehlich, supra note 49. 
 53. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 51–52. 
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al.”54 The Court’s focus was on the government’s role in the procurement 
of the statement.55 If the statement was obtained, for example, with a 
view toward facilitating a criminal prosecution, then it would likely be 
considered testimonial.56 
The Crawford Court significantly changed the interpretation of the 
Confrontation Clause in all criminal cases in the United States. Although 
the exact meaning of “testimonial” remained unclear, the Court did make 
it clear that, without the crucible of cross-examination, testimonial hear-
say is inadmissible.57 That means that virtually all hearsay statements 
offered from an unavailable declarant require a Crawford analysis.58 Al-
though Crawford redefined the law, it created many more questions than 
it answered. 
Following Crawford, the United States Supreme Court considered 
two consolidated cases dealing with the definition of “testimonial state-
ments” for the purpose of the Sixth Amendment right to confrontation.59 
In Davis v. Washington, the Court, again in an opinion authored by Jus-
tice Scalia, contrasted two different factual situations involving state-
ments made by witnesses to law enforcement officials.60 
Scalia’s opinion focused carefully on the specific factual differenc-
es between the two situations. In the primary case, Davis, the statements 
at issue were made during a 911 call to an emergency operator regarding 
an alleged domestic violence situation that was actively occurring at the 
time the call was made.61 When the complainant did not appear for trial, 
the trial judge, over a defense objection, admitted the substance of the 
call into evidence.62 
In Davis’s companion case, Hammon v. Indiana, the statements at 
issue were made to police officers who were investigating a possible 
domestic violence situation.63 The complainant made these statements to 
the officers when they arrived at the scene, after the complainant was 
separated from her husband (the defendant in the subsequent prosecu-
tion) and questioned by an officer as to what had occurred at the house 
prior to the arrival of the police.64 As in Davis, the complainant did not 
appear at trial, and her statement to the officer was read to the jury as an 
                                                 
 54. Id. 
 55. Id. at 67–68. 
 56. Id. at 50–51. 
 57. Id. at 61. 
 58. Id. 
 59. See Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813 (2006). 
 60. Id. 
 61. Id. at 817–18. 
 62. Id. at 819. 
 63. Id. 
 64. Id. at 819–20. 
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excited utterance, over a defense objection to the lack of opportunity for 
cross-examination.65 The Court determined that, because the statements 
were made during a custodial interrogation following proper Miranda 
warnings, the statements were not testimonial.66 The Court’s ruling de-
monstrates that the factual circumstances of the statement at issue are 
critical to the determination of whether that statement is testimonial in 
nature and, therefore, subject to the Crawford constitutional require-
ments.67 As a result of the Davis/Hammon decision, the Court clarified 
Crawford and articulated a narrow exception. When the primary purpose 
of a statement taken by police during interrogation is to enable police 
assistance in meeting an ongoing emergency, the statement will not be 
testimonial nor subject to the Confrontation Clause. 
Following Davis, in its second major application of Crawford, the 
Court further refined the landscape of Confrontation Clause analysis by 
determining that even a state-certified forensic analyst’s opinion made 
under oath constituted testimonial hearsay.68 In Melendez-Diaz v. Massa-
chusetts, the defendant was convicted of distributing and trafficking in 
cocaine.69 During the arrest, law enforcement agents seized a large quan-
tity of cocaine, packaged for sale.70 
The police sent the substance to the Massachusetts Department of 
Health’s State Laboratory Institute for testing.71 The laboratory was regu-
larly used for testing of controlled substances, and the testing was a pre-
requisite for criminal prosecution.72 Two state-certified forensic analysts 
issued opinions supported by certificates that the material seized con-
sisted of controlled substances.73 These certificates were sworn under 
oath pursuant to Massachusetts law.74 Furthermore, under Massachusetts 
law, these certificates were admissible at trial without the testimony of 
                                                 
 65. Id. at 820. 
 66. Id. at 822. 
 67. Id. (“Without attempting to produce an exhaustive classification of all conceivable state-
ments—or even all conceivable statements in response to police interrogation—as either testimonial 
or nontestimonial, it suffices to decide the present cases to hold as follows: Statements are nontesti-
monial when made in the course of police interrogation under circumstances objectively indicating 
that the primary purpose of the interrogation is to enable police assistance to meet an ongoing emer-
gency. They are testimonial when the circumstances objectively indicate that there is no such ongo-
ing emergency, and that the primary purpose of the interrogation is to establish or prove past events 
potentially relevant to later criminal prosecution.”). 
 68. Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 129 S. Ct. 2527, 2532 (2009). 
 69. Id. at 2530–31. 
 70. Id. at 2530. 
 71. Id. at 2531. 
 72. Id. 
 73. Id. 
 74. Id. 
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the analysts,75 and were admitted without the testimony of the analysts.76 
In his objection, Melendez-Diaz cited to Crawford and argued that the 
statements violated his right of confrontation.77 
The Court held that the laboratory certificates were testimonial 
statements and that the affiants were “witnesses” for purposes of the 
Sixth Amendment.78 In its ruling, the Court drew on its initial holding in 
Crawford, but also its holding in Davis. The Court reasoned that a certif-
icate from a laboratory was an “affidavit” because it was a “solemn dec-
laration or affirmation made for the purpose of establishing or proving 
some fact.”79 Davis, either clarifying or expanding Crawford, added an 
additional factor: the intent of the declarant in making the statement. For 
example, the court should ask whether the statement was made to assist 
police in meeting an emergency, or whether it was made to assist them in 
facilitating an arrest and prosecution. In focusing on the intent of the dec-
larant, the Court used an objective test, concluding that the circumstances 
of preparation would lead an objective witness to believe that the state-
ment would be available for later use at trial.80 The Court rejected the 
argument that these certificates were not from an “accusatory witness,” 
reasoning that the Sixth Amendment only contemplates two types of evi-
dence: that offered against the accused under the Confrontation Clause 
and that offered in favor of the accused by the right to Compulsory 
Process.81  
Melendez-Diaz extended the reach of the Confrontation Clause and 
the application of Crawford to testimonial hearsay.82 Although Melendez-
Diaz did not redefine testimonial hearsay, it did expand the scope of evi-
dentiary issues requiring a Crawford analysis. After Melendez-Diaz, any 
hearsay offered against an accused with an unavailable declarant and 
lack of prior cross-examination demands a Crawford analysis. The ex-
tension of Crawford to forensic certificates suggests that there may be no 
limit to this proposition.83 
                                                 
 75. Id. 
 76. Id. 
 77. Id. 
 78. Id. 
 79. Id. (citing Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 51 (2004)). 
 80. Melendez-Diaz, 129 S. Ct. at 2532. 
 81. Id. at 2533–34. 
 82. Froehlich, supra note 49. 
 83. One state taking issue with the breadth of Crawford’s application to all testimonial hearsay 
is New Mexico. In September of 2010, the U.S. Supreme Court accepted a writ of certiorari in the 
case of Donald Bullcoming v. New Mexico, 189 P.3d 679 (N.M. 2008), cert. granted, 131 S. Ct. 62 
(2010). The question posed for certiorari in Bullcoming was “[w]hether the Confrontation Clause 
permits the prosecution to introduce testimonial statements of a nontestifying forensic analyst 
through the in-court testimony of a supervisor or other person who did not perform or observe the 
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III. EMERGENCE OF THE OFFICER/EXPERT 
An analysis of the emergence of the gang expert and dealing with 
expert testimony must begin with a discussion of ER 702 and ER 703. 
While unique in the specific issues they present, gang experts are in 
some respects similar to any other expert, so their testimony must be ana-
lyzed under the same framework. 
A. The Scope of Rules 702 and 703 
At both the federal and state level, ER 702 allows for the admission 
of scientific, testimonial, or specialized evidence that will assist the trier 
of fact.84 Evidence offered under ER 702 may be provided by a witness 
who is qualified by virtue of training, experience, or formal education on 
the topic.85 Under the federal rule, however, and in most states, expert 
testimony must be based on sufficient facts and data, and be the product 
of reliable principles and methods.86 Moreover, the expert must have ap-
plied those principles and methods reliably to the facts of the case.87 In 
Washington, the expert may rely on facts or data made known to the ex-
pert at or before the hearing.88 Those facts or data need not be admissible 
as evidence, so long as they are of a type reasonably relied on by experts 
to form opinions in the particular field.89 But, in a criminal case, an ex-
pert’s testimony cannot exceed the limits of the underlying science or art. 
If the expert opinion is based on a scientific theory or method, the theory 
or method should be one that is generally accepted in the scientific com-
munity.90 
At both the federal and state level, ER 703 has a broad spectrum. It 
is not limited to scientific information, but rather extends to technical or 
specialized knowledge.91 Therefore, a witness’s expertise need not be 
based on academic credentials, but instead can be based on training or 
                                                                                                             
laboratory analysis described in the statements.” Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Bullcoming, No. 09-
10876, 2010 WL 3761875, at *i. Bullcoming seemingly asks the Court to reexamine its holding in 
Melendez-Diaz, at least as it relates to testimonial hearsay offered under the business-records excep-
tion to the hearsay rule. At the very least, it asks the Court to clarify whether the Melendez-Diaz 
analysis should extend to cases in which an expert witness testifies about forensic certificates he did 
not prepare. At least one Washington court has addressed this issue and held that such expert testi-
mony does not violate Melendez-Diaz. State v. Lui, 153 Wash. App. 304, 221 P.3d 948 (2009). 
 84. FED. R. EVID. 702, 703; WASH. R. EVID. 702, 703. 
 85. FED. R. EVID. 702, 703; WASH. R. EVID. 702, 703. 
 86. FED. R. EVID. 702, 703; WASH. R. EVID. 702, 703. 
 87. FED. R. EVID. 702, 703. 
 88. WASH. R. EVID. 703; State v. Roberts, 142 Wash. 2d 471, 14 P.3d 713 (2000). 
 89. WASH. R. EVID. 702, 703. 
 90. Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923); State v. Baity, 140 Wash. 2d. 1, 991 
P.2d 1151 (2000). 
 91. FED. R. EVID. 703; WASH. R. EVID. 703. 
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experience. Expert witnesses come from a host of skills arenas, including 
law enforcement.92 In the final analysis, the test is whether that expertise 
falls outside the understanding and skill of the trier of fact and would 
assist the trier of fact in understanding the evidence.93 
The party calling an expert must show that the expert possesses 
scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge.94 Whether the wit-
ness is sufficiently qualified as an expert is a matter to be decided by the 
court, although the court may permit a voir dire examination of the ex-
pert’s qualifications to express a particular opinion.95 Where the court 
finds the witness unqualified, the witness may be excused before present-
ing an opinion to the jury.96 It is preferable that the court not advise the 
jury of its determination if it decides that the witness is qualified as an 
expert on the particular subject matter.97 Doing so could give the expert 
added credibility in the eyes of the jury. A witness may be qualified as an 
expert by reason of knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education. 
Under Rule 703, a witness may be qualified as an expert by virtue of any 
one such factor, or on a combination of any of the factors.98 Specific de-
grees, certificates of training, or membership in a professional organiza-
tion are not required.  
Washington law generally accords with federal law, with two ex-
ceptions. First, FRE 702 was amended in 2000 to add new requirements 
regarding expert testimony.99 Second, also in 2000, FRE 703 was 
amended by adding language addressing whether the basis for an ex-
                                                 
 92. State v. McPherson, 111 Wash. App. 747, 761–62, 46 P.3d 284 (2002). 
 93. Mason Ladd, Expert Testimony, 5 VAND. L. REV. 414, 418–19 (1952). 
 94. WASH. R. EVID. 702; Sehlin v. Chi., Milwaukee, St. Paul & Pac. R.R. Co., 38 Wash. App. 
125, 686 P.2d 492 (1984). 
 95. FED. R. EVID. 104(a). 
 96. After a voir dire by the opposing counsel, the court may, in its discretion, either limit or 
refuse the expert testimony. FED. R. EVID. 103. Typically, this ruling is made when the proponent 
has failed to show that the expert’s training, education, or experience meets a level of expertise in 
the subject matter that will aid the trier of fact in its evaluation of the evidence. 
 97. 3 MICHAEL H. GRAHAM, HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL EVIDENCE § 702:2 (6th ed. 2010). 
 98. Id. 
 99. Until 2000, an expert could not explain the basis for his opinion. After the 2000 changes, at 
least at the federal level, an expert could explain the basis for his opinion at the court’s discretion. 
This change creates a problem when the opinion is based on inadmissible evidence. This change 
highlighted a problem with post-Crawford expert-testimony issues. While a jury could better weigh 
an expert’s testimony with an explanation, that explanation could expose the jury to inadmissible 
evidence. Some courts have used FRE 403 as a means to effect a balance between the jury’s right to 
know and potential prejudice. Under FRE 403, if the prejudicial effect substantially outweighs the 
probative value, then the basis for the opinion is not admitted. While Washington did not adopt this 
change, it is an important point for practitioners in federal courts and those states that did adopt the 
change. See generally Jennifer L. Mnookin, Expert Evidence and Confrontation Clause After Craw-
ford v. Washington, 15 J.L. & POL’Y 791 (2007). 
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pert’s opinion should be disclosed to the jury.100 No corresponding 
changes have been made to Washington’s rules.101 While the federal rules 
allow an expert to explain the basis for his opinion and the Washington 
rules do not, that distinction is of little significance when confronting 
Crawford issues. A federal court judge’s discretion might allow for the 
expert to explain the basis for his opinion, but doing so creates a substan-
tial risk. Although the jury is entitled to weigh the expert’s credibility, it 
often needs to understand how the expert arrived at his conclusions to 
effectively weigh that credibility. Giving the jury access to information 
about how the expert arrived at his conclusions might allow the jury to 
hear evidence that is otherwise inadmissible under Crawford. Although 
the amended federal rules do recognize the jury’s need to fully under-
stand the quality of the evidence it receives, the rules create a significant 
risk that the jury will hear evidence that can taint its perspective. While 
FRE 702 and 703 may allow this, FRE 403 precludes the admission of 
the basis for the expert opinion when the evidence is substantially more 
prejudicial than probative.102 As a result, federal courts are reluctant to 
admit the basis for an expert opinion as evidence. This reluctance high-
lights the problems created when an expert’s testimony is based on oth-
erwise inadmissible testimonial hearsay. If a court permits an expert to 
explain the basis of his opinion, it permits admission of testimonial hear-
say in direct violation of Crawford. 
B. The Rise of the Gang Expert 
As organized crime became more sophisticated in its operations and 
gangs became more involved in organized criminal enterprises, it was 
inevitable that law enforcement would develop skills devoted to these 
changes. In the 1980s, a new type of “skilled witness” emerged: the law 
enforcement officer.103 In criminal cases, typically at the federal level, 
prosecutors began calling law enforcement officers to testify as experts 
on “the nature and structure of organized crime families.”104 For instance, 
in United States v. Ardito,  the government called an FBI agent to testify 
as an expert about terms such as “captain,” “capo,” “regime,” and 
“crew.”105 The Second Circuit Court of Appeals upheld the admission of 
that expert testimony because it “aided the jury in its understanding of” 
                                                 
 100. TEGLAND, supra note 21, at 368. 
 101. Id. at 360. 
 102. FED. R. EVID. 403; WASH. R. EVID. 403. 
 103. United States v. Mejia, 545 F.3d 179, 189 (2d Cir. 2008). 
 104. Id. (quoting United States v. Daly, 842 F.2d 1380, 1388 (2d Cir. 1988)). 
 105. United States v. Ardito, 782 F.2d 358, 363 (2d Cir. 1986). 
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recorded conversations between the two defendants.106 Subsequent cases 
in the Second Circuit also upheld the admission of expert testimony by a 
law enforcement officer on the related matter of the meaning of messag-
es written in code.107 
As law enforcement expertise evolved, courts approved new and 
unique uses of gang experts, including testimony on increasingly broad 
ranges of issues. This included testimony on the unique characteristics of 
particular crime families in the United States.108 Despite the expanding 
breadth, courts allowed gang expert testimony based on a fairly simplis-
tic analysis of FRE 703; the expert testimony fell outside the understand-
ing of a typical juror and was, therefore, helpful and admissible under the 
rule.109 Just as an anthropologist could testify to the organization and so-
cial mores of a particular culture, so too could the gang expert testify 
based on his education about and experience with the social mores of a 
particular gang.110 Moreover, allowing law enforcement to testify to these 
aspects of gang culture was an acknowledgement of legislative intent of 
statutes designed to address unique issues associated with organized 
criminal enterprises.111 
C. The Trouble with Gang Expert Testimony 
Although there is no doubt that gang expert testimony has utility in 
the criminal justice system, unchecked, it can be used to unfairly disad-
vantage the defendant and even to threaten the constitutional right to a 
                                                 
 106. Id. 
 107. United States v. Levasseur, 816 F.2d 37, 45 (2d Cir. 1987). 
 108. See generally United States v. Daly, 842 F.2d 1380 (2d Cir. 1988) (testimony on the 
Gambino crime family). For example, in Daly, an FBI agent’s expert testimony “identified the five 
organized crime families that operate in the New York area” and “described their requirements for 
membership, their rules of conduct and code of silence, and the meaning of certain jargon.” Id. at 
1388. 
 109. Id. See generally Levasseur, 816 F.2d at 45. 
 110. United States v. Mejia, 545 F.3d 179, 190 (2d Cir. 2008) (citing Dang Vang v. Toyed, 944 
F.2d 476, 481–82 (9th Cir. 1991) (upholding the district court’s admission of expert testimony on 
Hmong culture)). The court explained: 
[L]aw enforcement officers may be equipped by experience and training to speak to the 
operation, symbols, jargon, and internal structure of criminal organizations. Officers inte-
ract with members of the organization, study its operations, and exchange information 
with other officers. As a result, they are able to break through the group’s antipathy to-
ward outsiders and gain valuable knowledge about its parochial practices and insular lex-
icon. Allowing law enforcement officers to act as experts in cases involving these oft-
impenetrable criminal organizations thus responds to the same concerns that animated the 
enactment of the criminal laws that such organizations (and their members) are typically 
charged with violating, such as the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act 
and the more recent Violent Crimes in Aid of Racketeering Act. 
Id. (citations omitted). 
 111. Id. 
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fair trial.112 This is harmful to both a defendant and to the criminal justice 
system. When a gang expert police officer’s testimony is unchecked, 
there is a real risk that the expert officer may incorporate inadmissible 
evidence into his opinion. Such testimony circumvents the rules of evi-
dence that would otherwise preclude the admission of that evidence. The 
defendant is then placed in the untenable position of having to defend 
against inadmissible evidence. If the defendant attempts to discredit that 
evidence, he runs the risk of emphasizing it to the jury. If, however, he 
fails to address the evidence, then it is considered by the jury, its credi-
bility uncontested. When defendants are placed in this untenable posi-
tion, it not only harms them, but it also damages the fundamental tenets 
of the criminal justice system, not the least of which is the presumption 
of innocence.  
Although sociological and anthropological knowledge is important 
in understanding gang organization, an officer should never be allowed 
to substitute his expert opinion for facts derived from his criminal inves-
tigation of the accused. Gang expert testimony presents the real possibili-
ty of such a substitution occurring. If the officer expert goes beyond the 
limits of his expertise, he loses his status as “anthropologist/sociologist” 
and becomes, simply, a fact witness who includes all evidence he consi-
dered, regardless of its admissibility.113 The expert no longer helps the 
jury understand. Rather, the expert tells the jury what to decide.114 
In the introductory hypothetical, Ortiz could render an expert opi-
nion based on experience and study, but not on a factual opinion regard-
ing the defendant’s criminal liability. For example, Ortiz could offer an 
expert opinion that GD 18 members wear red clothes to signify their 
membership in the gang based on his experience talking to members of 
that gang. But he could not use that same information garnered from 
gang members to offer a factual opinion that the defendant was a mem-
ber of the GD 18 gang because he was wearing a red shirt when appre-
hended. In such a scenario, Ortiz’s opinion is harmful to the defendant. 
The factual opinion places the defendant in a position where he must be 
able to confront those who (1) said he was wearing a red shirt, and (2) 
said he was a member of GD 18. On the other hand, it seems less likely 
that the defendant would want to confront those who said GD 18 mem-
bers wear red. If that fact is not true, the defendant’s attorney could raise 
doubts about the expert’s methods and sources of information during 
cross-examination. The attorney could even bring in a real GD 18 mem-
ber to testify that GD 18 members wear all colors or don’t wear red at all. 
                                                 
 112. Id. 
 113. Id. at 196. 
 114. See generally id. at 190–91. 
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Typically, allowing the gang expert to testify as a fact witness has 
the effect of corroborating other factual testimony in the case and provid-
ing an “expert” summary of what the jury has heard from other fact wit-
nesses. The gang expert’s dual role was never contemplated by the rules 
of evidence, let alone the Anglo-American common law.115 “The officer 
expert transforms into the hub of the case, displacing the jury by con-
necting and combining all other testimony and physical evidence into a 
coherent, discernible, internally consistent picture of the defendant’s 
guilt.”116 When the officer expert comes to court and simply disgorges 
his factual knowledge to the jury, the expert is no longer aiding the jury 
in its fact finding; he is instructing the jury on the existence of the facts 
needed to satisfy the elements of the charged offense.117 
Today, gang expert testimony has become a cottage industry. One 
need only search Google to find hundreds of references to individuals 
marketing themselves as gang experts.118 Although some of these experts 
come from academia, the large majority of those advertising are former 
or retired members of law enforcement.119 Add to those numbers the 
growing number of gang experts active in law enforcement, and you 
have a large and growing, yet seemingly unregulated, body of expertise. 
Because ER 703 does not necessarily require education or certification of 
expertise, there is, apparently, no objective means of regulating or certi-
fying gang experts.120 
I do not intend to criticize the evolving area of gang expertise. The 
evolution of gangs in the United States and their increasing role in orga-
nized crime make it necessary for the nation’s law enforcement commu-
                                                 
 115. MARTIN ANTONIO SABELLI & JEFF CHORNEY, OFFICE OF DEFENDER SERV. TRAINING 
BRANCH, GANG EXPERT TESTIMONY AND THE APPLICABILITY OF CRAWFORD, 
http://www.fd.org/pdf_lib/MT07_CrossExamination.pdf (last visited Feb. 28, 2011). 
 116. Id. 
 117. United States v. Nersesian, 824 F.2d 1294, 1308 (2d Cir. 1987). 
 118. Search Results for “Gang Expert Witnesses,” GOOGLE, http://www.google.com (search 
for “gang expert witnesses,” then follow search hyperlink, approximately 224,000 results) (last vi-
sited Feb. 2, 2011). 
 119. Search Results for “Gang Expert Witnesses for Hire,” GOOGLE, http://www.google.com 
(search for “gang expert witnesses for hire,” then follow search hyperlink, approximately 46,500 
results) (last visited Feb. 2, 2011). Experts advertising their services were typically members of law 
enforcement or academia. 
 120. While a particular police organization might require some training of its gang experts, 
rarely is that an objective training or certification process. Instead, it is police officers regulating the 
skills and training of other police officers. Certainly, this is not an inappropriate approach for most 
police training. But the area of gang expertise has such an extraordinary impact on case disposition 
that it cries out for an objective and neutral certification standard. Currently, trial judges are left to 
regulate the nature and scope of this testimony, thereby standing between the testimony and the 
sanctity of the jury’s fact-finding role. See generally WASH. R. EVID. 103, 104; United States v. 
Lombardozzi, 491 F.3d 61 (2d. Cir. 2007); United States v. Mejia, 545 F.3d 179 (2d Cir. 2008); 
United States v. Dukagjini, 326 F.3d 45 (2d Cir. 2003). 
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nity to marshal as many resources as possible to fight gang crime. Yet, as 
is often the case, unbridled law enforcement activity can sometimes, per-
haps even unintentionally, conflict with fundamental constitutional prin-
ciples of due process, evidence rules, and case law interpreting our rules 
of evidence. Such is the case with gang expert testimony. The relatively 
lax standards of ER 702 and 703, coupled with the standards set forth in 
both Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals121 and Frye,122 cast the 
judge in the role of “gatekeeper,” tasked with ensuring that expert testi-
mony does not traverse the boundary of “expertise,” straying into “fact” 
and invading the province of the jury. Accordingly, courts must recog-
nize this potential invasion and adopt procedures to ensure that experts 
do not exceed the bounds of their expertise. 
IV. THE INTERSECTION OF GANG EXPERT TESTIMONY AND THE 
REQUIREMENTS OF CRAWFORD V. WASHINGTON 
The issues presented by Crawford call for a methodology for trial-
court judges to employ in order to best ensure that gang experts do not 
exceed the bounds of their expertise. To arrive at a model methodology 
requires the trial-court judge to first consider the implications of Craw-
ford and the cases following it. The judge must then compare those im-
plications with the authority of ER 702 and 703. On a case-by-case basis, 
the court must have a method to reconcile the implications of Crawford 
                                                 
 121. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., 509 U.S. 579 (1993). Daubert sets out a twelve-step 
approach for the analysis of “scientific evidence.” Ultimately, it is the judge who decides the relative 
reliability of the proffered evidence that can take the form of processes as well as substantive evi-
dence. Daubert’s holding was extended to nonscientific evidence in Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 
526 U.S. 139 (1999). Currently, thirty states and the federal courts accept Daubert, fourteen states 
reject it, and seven states neither reject nor accept Daubert. Washington State is one of the fourteen 
states that have totally rejected the Daubert standard in favor of the Frye standard. Martin S. Kauf-
man, The Status of Daubert in State Courts, ATL. LEGAL FOUND. (Mar. 2006), 
http://www.atlanticlegal.org/daubertreport.pdf. 
 122. Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923). The Frye standard is the older and 
more conservative standard used under FRE 702 for the evaluation of both scientific and nonscientif-
ic yet technical evidence. Under Frye, an expert’s testimony cannot exceed the underlying scientific 
or technical understanding. It must be accepted in the scientific community. Because Frye is not 
limited to purely scientific evidence, the “scientific” community for Frye necessarily includes law 
enforcement. In State v. Baity, 140 Wash. 2d 1, 11–13, 991 P.2d 1151 (2000), the Washington State 
Supreme Court reaffirmed that Frye would continue to be the Washington standard for acceptance of 
scientific or technical evidence. Baity concerned the acceptance of a drug recognition protocol used 
in the enforcement of drunk driving laws. Id. at 3–7. As in the case of gang experts, the police offic-
er is proffered as the expert witness in the drug recognition protocol. Id. at 6. Application of the Frye 
standard is relatively simple. TEGLAND, supra note 21, at 364–67. If the science or technique used 
by the expert is accepted in the relative scientific community, then it comports with the Frye stan-
dard. The scientific community can include those charged with implementing the technique. While 
not yet litigated in Washington State, it seems likely that the applicable scientific community for 
evaluating the validity of gang expert testimony will be the law enforcement community. Baity, 140 
Wash. 2d at 12. 
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and the applicable evidentiary rules. As a first step, the judge must de-
termine whether Crawford applies at all. On a threshold level, this means 
determining whether the declarant is unavailable and whether there was a 
prior opportunity for cross-examination. 
The next step in the analysis requires looking to the circumstances 
surrounding the statement. The judge should answer the following ques-
tions: Who took the statement? What questions were posed, and what 
was the intent in posing the questions? What was done with the informa-
tion obtained? When were the questions posed in relation to the alleged 
criminal conduct? The judge must answer these questions before making 
a reasoned decision on the apparent purpose of the statement at the time 
it was made.123 
Next, the judge must establish regular procedures for evaluating 
such issues at trial. Two points are clear from Melendez-Diaz. First, tes-
timonial hearsay is not limited to the core examples stated in Crawford. 
Second, the objective intent analysis of Davis is a solid, albeit non-
exclusive, criterion in determining whether a given statement is testi-
monial. Therefore, at trial, the proponent of the evidence must first estab-
lish that she can meet the foundation for admission of the evidence under 
a recognized exception to the hearsay rule.124 Only after establishing that 
foundation does the proponent advance to a Crawford analysis. Law-
yers—through ignorance, inadvertence, or even design—often attempt to 
meld the issues of hearsay and the Confrontation Clause. But these two 
areas are separate and must be treated accordingly. Either analysis can be 
done first. Given the holding in Melendez-Diaz,125 any admissible hear-
say falling within a recognized hearsay exception will be subject to this 
sequence. Currently, the Washington Rules of Evidence recognize twen-
ty-seven hearsay exceptions, any of which could conceivably apply in a 
given criminal case.126 
In one respect, Crawford gave trial-court judges a level of clarity 
and certainty to Confrontation Clause analysis.127 Certainly, Crawford 
affords greater clarity than Roberts, which left the Confrontation Clause 
analysis exclusively to the trial-court judge.128 Now, instead of answering 
questions of reliability and trustworthiness under the Roberts standard, 
trial-court judges must “only” answer the question of whether the prof-
                                                 
 123. See generally Mnookin, supra note 99. 
 124. Jack Nevin, Pierce Cnty. Dist. Court Judge, Presentation to the Washington Association 
of Prosecuting Attorneys (June 2, 2010). Note that under the prior criteria of Ohio v. Roberts, 448 
U.S. 56 (1980), the analysis would, in most instances, stop here. 
 125. Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 129 S. Ct. 2527 (2009). 
 126. TEGLAND, supra note 21, at 401–70. 
 127. See generally Mnookin, supra note 99. 
 128. Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 60 (2004). 
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fered hearsay is “testimonial.”129 Admittedly, determining whether hear-
say is testimonial is a more finite question than under prior law, but it is 
still by no means a simple determination.130 In allowing that single crite-
rion, Crawford may have created more questions than it answered.131 
There are three methods a prosecutor can use to offer gang expert 
testimony, all of which raise Crawford issues. First, the expert’s report 
can be offered under the business-records exception to the hearsay 
rule.132 Under Melendez-Diaz, Crawford applies to the expert’s reports, 
including laboratory analysis, because the expert’s opinion is testimonial 
and deserving of cross-examination.133 Second, the expert can testify 
about another expert’s results and analysis through the business-records 
exception to the hearsay rule. In this instance, the person who did the 
laboratory work is not present but another expert is there to testify to the 
first expert’s opinion and its accuracy. At least one court in Washington 
has allowed this kind of testimony.134 The third method occurs when an 
expert uses witness interviews as a basis for his expert opinion. Invaria-
bly, those witnesses, often informants, are unavailable for trial.135 Be-
cause the expert, often a gang expert, is offering his testimony under ER 
703, he is allowed to base his opinion on otherwise inadmissible hear-
say.136 Only one case in Washington State has addressed this issue, hold-
ing that an expert’s testimony based on testimonial hearsay violates the 
Confrontation Clause.137 
It is this third area that places gang expert testimony and the prin-
ciples of Crawford on a collision course. In this area, the police officer 
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 130. Id. at 64. 
 131. For example, considering the important questions presented by Davis, whose intent should 
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occupies two roles: a fact witness as a lead investigator and an expert 
witness as a gang expert. Under ER 703, an expert may rely on evidence 
that is otherwise inadmissible.138 Although the 2000 amendments to the 
federal rules allow the expert to share the basis for his opinion, doing so 
allows him to become a conduit for the admission of inadmissible evi-
dence.139 Courts probably allow experts to rely on inadmissible evidence 
due to historical deference to their expertise. If the expert says that he 
must consider inadmissible evidence, and that his professional peer 
group considers such evidence, and he otherwise qualifies as an expert 
under ER 703, should he be allowed to do so? Should the jury have 
access to this information? How can the court guard against the real pos-
sibility that the jury will accept this background information for its truth, 
even though it is only offered as a basis for the expert’s opinion? A limit-
ing instruction requiring jurors to accept the evidence for a narrow pur-
pose will only emphasize that evidence to jurors. Human nature makes it 
difficult for jurors to bifurcate their understanding of testimonial hearsay, 
regardless of why it is offered. On the one hand, understanding the basis 
for the expert’s opinion allows the jury to adequately weigh the expert’s 
opinion. On the other, receiving that evidence allows juror’s access to 
information that is otherwise inadmissible. This forces the court to 
choose between allowing the witness to disclose the information, thereby 
tainting the jury, and precluding jurors from effectively weighing the 
merits of the expert’s conclusions.140 
This conflict within the evidence rules is not new. Since the passage 
of the modern Federal Rules of Evidence, expert testimony has allowed 
for the inclusion of hearsay.141 Historically, the only basis for objecting 
came under FRE 403. If the evidence was substantially, and therefore 
unfairly, more prejudicial than probative, it would not be admitted.142 
The 2000 changes have made the nondisclosure of the expert’s basis the 
rule, although it is still within the judge’s discretion.143 The fact that 
Washington has not adopted the 2000 changes does not shield Washing-
ton from the problem. If jurors hear the inadmissible evidence forming 
the basis for the expert opinion, the evidence will likely prejudice them. 
If they do not hear the basis for the opinion, but the expert opinion is still 
expressed to them, they end up at the same place, hearing inadmissible 
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evidence. In either situation, the jury is being provided, either directly or 
indirectly, inadmissible testimony. As the 2000 changes were not imple-
mented by Washington, it would seem the only standard by which to re-
gulate the admission of testimonial hearsay, short of applying Crawford 
principles, is ER 403.144 Although scholars may debate its propriety, the 
law today is clear: So long as it is reasonably relied on by experts in the 
field, an expert witness may rely on inadmissible hearsay to formulate 
his opinion.145 
As problematic as the current law may be, it still does not address 
the more serious question of the admissibility of testimony based not on-
ly on hearsay, but also on testimonial hearsay in violation of Craw-
ford.146 Although this issue can present itself in any expert witness’s tes-
timony, gang expert testimony particularly lends itself to the potential for 
the admission of testimonial hearsay. There are two areas where a gang 
expert will often base an opinion on testimonial hearsay. One is where he 
is testifying about someone else’s findings, often another expert. The 
second occurs when he is relying on statements he heard during his own 
investigation.147 
Police officers testifying as investigators and experts risk violating 
Crawford and preventing the defendant from receiving a fair trial. As an 
investigator, the gang expert police officer is likely to have conducted 
interviews of known gang members. It is inevitable that he will have 
conducted numerous interviews while investigating his case. Additional-
ly, as an investigator, he is a fact witness. His dual status compounds the 
                                                 
 144. TEGLAND, supra note 21, at 229–36. 
 145. After having tried and presided over hundreds of trials, I took pause to reflect on why the 
issue of hearsay as a basis for expert opinion has not been the subject of more litigation at the appel-
late court level. The answer perhaps lies in the number of exceptions to the hearsay rule: twenty-
seven in Washington State. Add to that the instances in which a court finds that the evidence was not 
admitted to prove the truth of the matter. Coupled with the ever-present option of limiting instruc-
tions to a jury, one can conclude that, as a practical matter, these issues simply do not present them-
selves often enough outside of scholarship. WASH R. EVID. 702, 703, 801, 807; City of Bellevue v. 
Kravik, 69 Wash. App. 735, 850 P.2d 559 (1993). 
 146. WASH R. EVID. 703; Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004); Kravik, 69 Wash. 
App. at 735. 
 147. Mnookin, supra note 99, at 805. Gang expert witnesses typically represent two groups. 
The first group is made up of those scholars and former members of law enforcement who, through 
either their study or experience, now market themselves as expert witnesses. Some truly are experts 
in every sense of the word. The expertise of others is open to debate. The relaxed requirements of 
ER 703 in most instances allow the jury to decide the nature and extent of that expertise. The second 
group of experts is made up of those who are active members of law enforcement actually investigat-
ing the case. They may qualify as experts under ER 703, but they also wear a second hat, that of an 
investigating police officer. This second category of gang expert is the most problematic for purpos-
es of Crawford. Distinguishing the experts’ fact testimony from their expert testimony is virtually 
impossible. Accordingly, the potential for circumventing Crawford is greatest with this kind of wit-
ness. United States v. Dukagjini, 326 F.3d 45, 53–54 (2d. Cir. 2003). 
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problem and creates the great risk that the expert and fact witness testi-
mony will meld. When faced with a gang expert investigating officer, the 
trial court must determine how to distinguish the witness’s fact testimony 
from his expert testimony, and also deal with the possibility that the of-
ficer may rely on testimonial hearsay. 
At this point in the analysis, an inevitable question arises: How can 
we maintain both the vitality of ER 703 and the science of gang exper-
tise? Is there a means of allowing this testimony while still embracing the 
requirements of Crawford? A gang expert, whether a consultant or an 
investigating officer, should be allowed to express opinions based on a 
neutral analysis of the facts. These opinions should be based on the ex-
pert’s skill, training, and education.148 For example, testimony regarding 
gang culture, organization, and social mores based on the expert’s study 
is appropriate. But what of the situation where the expert bases his opi-
nions on statements of now unavailable witnesses who have not been 
subject to cross-examination? Is this a violation of Crawford?149 Should 
it be? In the instance of the police investigator expert, the Davis criterion 
is most helpful: “Would the information reasonably be expected to be 
used in a criminal prosecution?”150 If the answer is yes, then (assuming 
the other requirements are satisfied) Crawford should apply. 
Despite these concerns, I do not argue that gang expert testimony 
should be entirely eliminated. Rather, we must determine how to imple-
ment ER 703 in a way that does not violate the tenets of Crawford. 
Courts rejecting the argument that Crawford applies to expert tes-
timony use outdated arguments to support their position.151 Most cases 
cited by the government in support of admission of testimonial hearsay 
through expert witnesses rely on cases decided prior to Crawford.152 Un-
derstandably, those courts used the reliability requirement of Roberts, the 
only standard at the time. With Roberts as their only guidance, pre-
Crawford decisions on the admissibility of testimonial hearsay simply 
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hold that if the evidence is not offered for the truth of the matter, then it 
is admissible under ER 703.153 
Yet, despite the government’s urgings, Roberts is no longer the law. 
If prior cross-examination is truly the crucible154 for determining reliabil-
ity, how can that standard be reconciled with the seemingly relaxed stan-
dard of ER 703?155 The answer to this question is that the two can be re-
conciled, but only by a process recognizing the applicability of Crawford 
to expert testimony in general, and gang expert testimony in particular. 
The foundation of ER 703 still includes reliability.156 The reliability 
determination necessarily includes asking whether the evidence consti-
tutes testimonial hearsay. Reliability, as defined by Roberts, can no long-
er be the touchstone. Under Roberts, if evidence passed a hearsay excep-
tion, then it was admissible under the Confrontation Clause. Under 
Crawford, unless there was a prior right of confrontation, testimonial 
hearsay is inadmissible even if it falls under a recognized exception.157 
Stated simply, Crawford added another layer of requirements. Crawford 
rejected the idea that a judge could make a threshold decision on whether 
evidence is reliable. The problem with Roberts was well-characterized by 
Crawford when the Court stated that the Roberts decision allowed a jury 
to hear evidence untested by the adversarial process based merely on 
judicial determination.158 The problem, however, is that the current state 
of the law in Washington allows the jury to do just that, in the context of 
ER 703.159 
Cases following Crawford have taken a more nuanced approach, 
balancing the prohibition of testimonial hearsay with the integrity of 
ER 703.160 These cases recognize that expert witnesses play an important 
role in the criminal justice system by assisting triers of fact in under-
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standing and evaluating evidence. Experts should, therefore, be able to 
rely on inadmissible evidence.161 But these cases also recognize that an 
expert cannot be a “transmitter” of testimonial hearsay.162 The trial judge 
is responsible for ensuring that such abuses do not occur.163 In order to 
live up to this responsibility, the trial judge must determine the degree to 
which the witness is relying on testimonial hearsay. This, in turn, re-
quires an evaluation of the entire context of the witness’s testimony.164 
Among the questions the court must consider is whether the witness used 
his independent judgment in rendering his opinion or whether, instead, 
his opinion is based exclusively on the testimonial statements of others. 
The court should also look to whether the expert is applying independent 
expertise to the information received and whether that expertise was 
gained over an extended period of time.165 If the court determines that the 
expert is merely parroting the testimony of an unavailable witness, then 
the court should eliminate that portion of the expert testimony. 
V. A FORMULA RECONCILING GANG EXPERT TESTIMONY WITH 
CRAWFORD V. WASHINGTON 
Gang expertise is a critical tool for the law enforcement communi-
ty, particularly in investigating and solving crimes committed by gang 
organizations.166 The sophistication of gang organizations in recent years 
has inhibited law enforcement’s ability to effectively collect admissible 
evidence.167 Furthermore, officers’ knowledge of the sociology, organi-
zational structure, jargon, and lifestyle of gang members is especially 
critical to criminal investigations.168 Irrespective of the importance of 
gang experts, gang expert testimony must still comply with Crawford. 
And although state and federal courts accept this proposition, no bright-
line rule exists for reconciling Crawford principles with ER 703, the evi-
dence rule designed to assist the trier of fact in answering complex ques-
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tions based on skill and experience beyond the lay understanding.169 An 
officer should be allowed to explain an organizational hierarchy of a 
gang; however, he should not be allowed to express his personal opi-
nion.170 Doing so takes the officer out of the expert role and places him 
in the police officer role. An expert should aid the understanding of facts, 
not summarize the factual conclusions a jury should draw. 
The State of Washington is not immune to the sophisticated evolu-
tion of gang operations in America. Accordingly, Washington courts 
recognize that gang status is relevant and, therefore, admissible.171 Yet, 
how can gang status be admissible without running afoul of Crawford? 
Although certificates and lab reports prepared exclusively for prosecu-
tion are relatively easy to characterize as testimonial in view of the hold-
ing of Melendez-Diaz,172 gang expert testimony is not so simple. Even 
though the gang expert has admissible evidence to offer, when the Wash-
ington gang expert begins discussing the particular gang on trial, the ad-
missibility of the information becomes unclear. Discussing the gang at 
trial, the expert may incorporate information gleaned from informants, 
other gang members, police officers who have interviewed other gang 
members, and other gang intelligence that violates Crawford. If the ex-
pert is an investigating officer in the case at trial, the problem is com-
pounded. An investigating officer often obtains information from a num-
ber of sources and extends that information to the case facts. It is imposs-
ible to discern the point at which a testifying officer leaves the area of 
expert analysis and begins telling the jury his opinion on the culpability 
of the defendant. Reliance on testimonial hearsay is certain to bring 
about such an occasion. 
The solution to this problem is not so much a formula as a process 
for judges to follow in confirming and eliminating portions of an expert’s 
testimony based on testimonial hearsay. Just as the trial court under Ro-
berts decided the question of reliability and trustworthiness,173 so too will 
the trial-court judge decide what information proffered by the witness 
exceeds the bounds of expert testimony and violates Crawford. 
Case law at the federal level provides good guidance for all Wash-
ington state trial-court judges to follow. Federal courts have approved the 
admission of expert testimony when it is generally limited to the compo-
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sition and structure of organized crime families.174 This testimony can 
serve to explain the operation, structure, membership, and terminology of 
gang cultures.175 Federal courts have also recognized the importance of 
limiting that expertise, ensuring that the expert witness does not become 
a fact witness and the conduit through which testimonial hearsay is deli-
vered to the jury. In United States v. Mejia, the Second Circuit, while 
reaffirming the admissibility of expert testimony in organized crime cas-
es, placed certain limitations on expert testimony by law enforcement 
agents.176 The Mejia court observed that: 
Our decision to permit such expert testimony reflects our under-
standing that, just as an anthropologist might be equipped by educa-
tion and fieldwork to testify to the cultural mores of a particular so-
cial group, law enforcement officers may be equipped by expe-
rience and training to speak to the operation, symbols, jargon, and 
internal structure of criminal organizations. Officers interact with 
members of the organization, study its operations, and exchange in-
formation with other officers. As a result, they are able to break 
through the group’s antipathy towards outsiders and gain valuable 
knowledge about its parochial practices and insular lexicon. Allow-
ing law enforcement officers to act as experts in cases involving 
these oft-impenetrable criminal organizations thus responds to the 
same concerns that animated the enactment of the criminal laws that 
such organizations (and their members) are typically charged with 
violating, such as [the racketeering statutes].177 
Given the need to reconcile Crawford with the utility of gang ex-
pert testimony, I offer the following suggestions to Washington’s trial 
judges: 
1. Determine the scope of the witness’s expertise and how the 
witness acquired the expertise. Consider education and training, 
as well as actual experience. 
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2. Assess whether the expert is arriving at an independent judg-
ment, applying the expert’s experience and training to the facts 
of the case. 
3. Allow testimony to be admitted at trial concerning the opera-
tion, structure, membership, and terminology of the gang.178 
4. Limit the expert’s testimony to the scope of the expert’s exper-
tise and the government’s offer of proof. Place the order to that 
effect in writing to reduce the possibility of ambiguity. Ensure 
that the witness is aware of the order and, preferably, enable the 
witness to see the order. 
5. Prohibit any testimony about the meaning or substance of con-
versations with witnesses not available for cross-examination. 
The existence and meaning of code words, if within the area of 
expertise, may be allowed.179 
6. Prohibit the interpretation of ambiguous slang terms or other 
words unique to the particular case. Overall knowledge of the 
use of slang terms, however, may be admitted. 
7. Require the government to identify all out-of-court statements 
it expects to be part of the expert testimony. 
8. Require that any recitation of out-of-court statements be ac-
companied by an application of the expertise and synthesis or 
analysis of the statement. Prohibit any out-of-court statements 
that are seemingly offered only for their truth without any syn-
thesis or analysis in the form of an expert opinion.180 
9. Extract from the government a commitment that the expert will 
rely on out-of-court statements as only one of many bases for 
the expert’s opinion, analysis, and conclusion.181 Include this 
commitment in a pretrial order. 
10. Forbid the verbatim repetition of any statement by an expert as 
well as the presentment of any statement as if it were the ex-
pert’s own testimony. 
11. Distinguish experts who are “consultants” from those who are 
the investigating officer on the case at trial. An expert who is 
also an investigating officer has a greater potential to deviate 
from the scope of expertise and effectively become a fact wit-
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ness. Ensure that the government is aware of your concern that 
this deviation not occur.182 
VI. CONCLUSION 
Crawford has created a new standard for reliability and, with that, 
new responsibility for trial-court judges. Judges now face the difficult 
prospect of applying Crawford criteria to a rule that predates Crawford. 
The rule has never been changed, although arguably there is a basis for 
doing so. Until that time, judges must be vigilant, particularly in regards 
to gang expert testimony, to ensure that the letter and spirit of Crawford 
are not violated. At the same time, courts must continue to recognize that 
expert witnesses do play an important role in educating juries on the 
unique aspects of what has now become a highly sophisticated area of 
crime. Unless and until ER 703 is changed, judges must make these im-
portant decisions on a case-by-case basis. Potential Crawford violations 
will always be a matter of degree,183 requiring judges to explore the 
unique circumstances of each new case. 
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